Suchergebnisse

Rimski ugovor dodjeljuje sucima različite i komplementarne sudbene funkcije kako bi jamčio, s jedne strane, jedinstvo europskog prava, a s druge njegovu učinkovitu primjenu koja poštuje nacionalne procedure. S jedne strane, prema Ugovoru, Sud Europske unije treba jamčiti izvjesno jedinstvo europskog prava, a s druge, nacionalni suci čiji legitimitet proizlazi iz njihova nacionalnog pravnog poretka – vrlo često ustavnog – moraju primjenjivati europsko pravo u sporovima u kojima sude. Kao europski suci općeg prava, oni se, prirodnim slijedom stvari, susreću s poteškoćama vezanim za uklapanje europskog pravnog poretka u nacionalni. Također moraju osigurati stalnu ravnotežu između poštivanja vlastitog nacionalnog pravnog poretka i razvoja "integracijskog prava". ; The Treaty of Rome grants judges varied and complementary judicial functions in order to guarantee, on the one hand, the unity of European Law and, on the other, its efficient application which respects national procedures. On the one hand, according to the Treaty, The European Union Court must guarantee the expected unity of European law and, on the other, national judges, whose legitimacy is founded on their national legal order which is most often constitutional, must apply European Law in the disputes they try. As European judges of common law, they naturally face the difficulties related to harmonising European law with national law. They must also ensure a continual balance between respecting one's own national legal order and developing "integrated law".

It has been assumed in international adjudication that each state in the litigation should be permitted to have a judge of its own nationality on the bench. This practice of employing national judges in international courts is deeply rooted in the history of arbitration and judicial settlement. Responding to a demand for it, the Committee of Jurists in 1920–1921 embodied the plan in Article 31 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. This article was transferred intact to the Statute of the present International Court of Justice in 1945. Whether judges of the nationality of the parties, either in arbitration tribunals or in courts of justice, can be counted upon to be as "independent" as the processes of justice require, and as Article 2 of the present Statute stipulates, is a question of some moment to present-day international justice. It has been suggested as an alternative that a judge on the International Court of the nationality of the litigant should abstain; thus a state with no judge of its nationality on the Court would not be at a disadvantage.

In National Judges as EU law Judges: The Polish Civil Law System Urszula Jaremba examines the way civil judges in Poland function as decentralised EU judges. To this end, the author employs legal and empirical - that is to say quantitative and qualitative - methodology and theory.

The advisability of permitting judges from litigant states to participate in hearings before international judicial tribunals has been a subject of disagreement on several occasions. It provoked serious controversy for the first time at the Hague Conference of 1907, when the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice was under discussion. Recently it has received even more attention in connection with the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice and in discussions of amendments to the Statute of the court and its rules.

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: "In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with."1

Where stands Collective Redress in the European Union (EU) following the Commission's Communication and Recommendation on common principles for collective redress mechanisms? This article reviews the recent history and current position of collective redress in England and Wales; states the author's view of what should be common principles for any system of collective redress; summarizes current collective redress schemes in Member States; considers the common principles recommended by the Commission; and addresses expressed but unjustified fears of abusive litigation. It concludes that Communication and Recommendation are generally to be welcomed but lack rigour and clarity as to the fundamental issue of an 'opt-in' or 'opt-out' basis for collective redress; and that real progress will be achieved only if the Recommendation is construed as providing that collective redress mechanisms should generally be 'opt-in' but, vitally, 'opt-out' where and to the extent that justice requires.

This article explores why national judges remain passive on EU legal integration by examining judges' reasons for not requesting preliminary rulings from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The article combines insights from social psychology and literature on the role of national courts in European integration to formulate expectations regarding what type of motives guide national judges' behaviours. Drawing on interviews held with Croatian, Slovenian and Swedish judges, our results reveal three shared reasons judges remain passive: referrals are not required by the formal rules (procedural normative motivation), referrals are not made to protect the parties to the case (substantive normative motivation) and referrals are not made to protect judges' reputations (instrumental motivation). In addition, we unveil motives that are shared by only judges from one or two Member States, such as not referring cases to uphold the capacity of the preliminary ruling procedure (Swedish judges) and not referring cases due to a fear of sanctions and a lack of knowledge and resources (Croatian and Slovenian judges). We discuss these similarities and divergences in light of the theoretical discussion on the role of courts as active or passive actors in EU legal integration.